CVE-2026-22818
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
A flaw in Hono’s JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware allowed the algorithm specified in the JWT header to influence signature verification when the selected JWK did not explicitly define an algorithm. This could enable JWT algorithm confusion and, in certain configurations, allow forged tokens to be accepted.
Details
When verifying JWTs using JWKs or a JWKS endpoint, the middleware selected the verification algorithm based on the JWK’s alg field if present. If the JWK did not specify an algorithm, the middleware fell back to using the alg value provided in the unverified JWT header.
Because the alg field in a JWK is optional and commonly omitted in real-world JWKS configurations, this behavior could allow an attacker to influence which algorithm is used for verification. In some environments, this may result in authentication or authorization bypass through crafted JWTs.
The practical impact depends on application configuration, including which algorithms are accepted and how JWTs are used to make authorization decisions.
Impact
In affected configurations, an attacker may be able to forge JWTs with attacker-controlled claims, potentially leading to authentication or authorization bypass.
Applications that do not use the JWK/JWKS middleware, do not rely on JWT-based authentication, or explicitly restrict allowed algorithms are not affected.
Resolution
Update to the latest patched release.
Breaking change:
The JWK/JWKS JWT verification middleware has been updated to require an explicit allowlist of asymmetric algorithms when verifying tokens. The middleware no longer derives the verification algorithm from untrusted JWT header values.
Instead, callers must explicitly specify which asymmetric algorithms are permitted, and only tokens signed with those algorithms will be accepted. This prevents JWT algorithm confusion by ensuring that algorithm selection is fully controlled by application configuration.
As part of this fix, the alg option is now required when using the JWK/JWKS middleware, and symmetric (HS*) algorithms are no longer accepted in this context.
Before (vulnerable configuration)
import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'
app.use(
'/auth/*',
jwk({
jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
// alg was optional
})
)
After (patched configuration)
import { jwk } from 'hono/jwk'
app.use(
'/auth/*',
jwk({
jwks_uri: 'https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json',
alg: ['RS256'], // required: explicit asymmetric algorithm allowlist
})
)
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
GitHub
3.9
CVSS SCORE
8.2high| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hono | npm | - | - | <4.11.4 | 4.11.4 |
CVSS:3 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any or all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.
NIST
3.9
CVSS SCORE
8.2highChainguard
CGA-mvcj-pc68-76cm
-