CVE-2026-44490

ADVISORY - github

Summary

Summary

axios 1.15.2 exposes two read-side prototype-pollution gadgets. When Object.prototype is polluted by an upstream dependency in the same process (e.g. lodash _.merge / CVE-2018-16487), axios silently picks up the polluted values:

  1. Header injection - lib/utils.js line 406 builds merge()'s accumulator as result = {}, so result[targetKey] (line 414) walks Object.prototype and the polluted bucket's own keys are copied into the merged headers and ride out on the wire.
  2. Crash DoS - lib/core/mergeConfig.js line 26 builds the hasOwnProperty descriptor as a plain-object literal. Object.defineProperty reads descriptor.get/descriptor.set via the prototype chain, so a polluted Object.prototype.get or Object.prototype.set makes the call throw TypeError synchronously on every axios request.

Affected Properties

Polluted slot Effect
Object.prototype.common injects headers on every method
Object.prototype.delete / .head / .post / .put / .patch / .query injects headers on the matching method
Object.prototype.get every axios request throws TypeError: Getter must be a function from mergeConfig.js:26
Object.prototype.set every axios request throws TypeError: Setter must be a function from mergeConfig.js:26

Per-request headers (axios.request(url, { headers: {...} })) overwrite polluted entries. Polluting Object.prototype.get triggers the crash before any header is built.

Proof of Concept

const axios = require('axios');

// Finding A - header injection
Object.prototype.common = { 'X-Poisoned': 'yes' };
await axios.get('http://api.example.com/users');
// Wire request carries `X-Poisoned: yes`.

// Finding B - crash DoS
Object.prototype.get = { something: 'anything' };
await axios.get('http://api.example.com/users');
// TypeError: Getter must be a function: #<Object>
//     at Function.defineProperty (<anonymous>)
//     at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:26:10)

Impact

  • Server hang (Content-Length: 99999): receiver waits for a body that never arrives. Affects requests with a body.
  • CL+TE conflict (Transfer-Encoding: chunked rides alongside axios's auto Content-Length): receiver rejects with 400 Bad Request. Affects requests with a body.
  • Response suppression (If-None-Match: *): receiver returns empty 304 Not Modified. Affects GET / HEAD.
  • Crash DoS (Object.prototype.get / .set): every axios request fails synchronously with TypeError, not AxiosError, so handlers filtering on error.isAxiosError mishandle the failure.

Attack Flow

flowchart TD
    ROOT["Polluted Object.prototype<br/>via upstream gadget (e.g. lodash &lt;= 4.17.10 _.merge / CVE-2018-16487)<br/>axios &lt;= 1.15.2"]

    ROOT --> CLASS_A["A. Arbitrary HTTP Header Injection<br/>Polluted defaults.headers slot rides along on every outbound axios request"]
    ROOT --> CLASS_B["B. Crash DoS via Object.prototype.get / .set<br/>Polluted descriptor breaks Object.defineProperty in mergeConfig"]

    CLASS_A --> PRE_A["Precondition: header not set per-request by the app<br/>Injected via defaults.headers slot<br/>(common, delete, head, post, put, patch, query)"]

    PRE_A --> PA1["Response Suppression<br/>Trigger: common = {If-None-Match: *}<br/>Affects GET / HEAD"]
    PA1 --> SA1["DoS<br/>304 Not Modified empty"]

    PRE_A --> PA2["Server Hang<br/>Trigger: common = {Content-Length: 99999}<br/>Affects requests with body"]
    PA2 --> SA2["DoS<br/>connection hang"]

    PRE_A --> PA3["CL+TE Conflict<br/>Trigger: common = {Transfer-Encoding: chunked}<br/>Affects requests with body"]
    PA3 --> SA3["DoS<br/>400 Bad Request"]

    CLASS_B --> SB1["DoS<br/>TypeError: Getter / Setter must be a function<br/>Crashes every axios request, not only GET"]

    %% Styles
    style ROOT fill:#f87171,stroke:#991b1b,color:#fff
    style CLASS_A fill:#fb923c,stroke:#9a3412,color:#fff
    style CLASS_B fill:#fb923c,stroke:#9a3412,color:#fff
    style PRE_A fill:#e2e8f0,stroke:#64748b,color:#1e293b
    style PA1 fill:#fbbf24,stroke:#92400e,color:#000
    style PA2 fill:#fbbf24,stroke:#92400e,color:#000
    style PA3 fill:#fbbf24,stroke:#92400e,color:#000
    style SA1 fill:#ef4444,stroke:#991b1b,color:#fff
    style SA2 fill:#ef4444,stroke:#991b1b,color:#fff
    style SA3 fill:#ef4444,stroke:#991b1b,color:#fff
    style SB1 fill:#ef4444,stroke:#991b1b,color:#fff

Root Cause

Finding A. lib/utils.js:404-429's merge() creates result = {} at line 406. The dangerous-keys filter on lines 408-411 blocks the write side, but the read at line 414 (isPlainObject(result[targetKey])) still walks the prototype chain. When targetKey matches a polluted slot, result[targetKey] returns the polluted nested object, and the recursive merge(result[targetKey], val) on line 415 iterates that object's own keys via forEach and copies them as own properties into the new accumulator. Those keys flow through mergeConfig.js:35Axios.js:148 (utils.merge(headers.common, headers[config.method])) → Axios.js:155 (AxiosHeaders.concat(...)) → onto the wire via http.js:677 (headers: headers.toJSON()) → http.js:767 (transport.request(options, ...)).

Finding B. lib/core/mergeConfig.js:25 correctly makes config = Object.create(null), but the descriptor passed on line 26 is a plain-object literal - its get/set lookups walk Object.prototype. A polluted non-function Object.prototype.get or .set makes Object.defineProperty throw TypeError: Getter must be a function (or Setter must be a function) before the call returns. The descriptor is built unconditionally on every mergeConfig invocation, so every axios request throws - POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH, HEAD, QUERY, not only GET.

Suggested Fix

Use null-prototype objects in place of the plain-object literals at lib/utils.js:406 and lib/core/mergeConfig.js:26-31. The same descriptor pattern recurs at lib/core/AxiosError.js:37, lib/core/AxiosHeaders.js:100, lib/utils.js:447/454/492/498, and lib/adapters/adapters.js:28/32.

Resources

  • CVE-2018-16487 - lodash.merge prototype pollution in lodash <= 4.17.10
  • CWE-1321 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

ADVISORY - github

Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')


GitHub

CREATED

UPDATED

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

2.2

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)

CVSS SCORE

4.8medium
PackageTypeOS NameOS VersionAffected RangesFix Versions
axiosnpm-->=1.0.0,<1.16.01.16.0
axiosnpm--<=0.31.10.32.0

CVSS:3 Severity and metrics

The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).

A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control, requiring investing a measurable amount of effort in research, preparation, or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack.

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

There is no loss of confidentiality.

Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.

Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.