CVE-2026-59887

ADVISORY - github

Summary

Summary

linkify-it's schema-scan loop (.test() / .match(), the documented public API) invokes the mailto: schema validator at every mailto: occurrence in the input text. For each occurrence the validator does text.slice(pos) (an O(n) copy) and runs an email regex whose local-part class src_email_name greedily scans the entire remaining tail (O(n)) before failing. With N mailto: occurrences that is N × O(n) = O(n²). Because linkify-it runs on arbitrary user text (markdown-it feeds it whole documents when linkify:true), an unauthenticated attacker can block the single-threaded event loop for many seconds with a small input. No length bound (unlike an HTTP header).

Root cause — index.mjs + lib/re.mjs

// index.mjs (mailto validator) — runs at every "mailto:" hit
'mailto:': { validate: function (text, pos, self) {
  const tail = text.slice(pos)                                  // O(n) copy per hit
  if (!self.re.mailto) self.re.mailto = new RegExp('^' + self.re.src_email_name + '@' + self.re.src_host_strict, 'i')
  if (self.re.mailto.test(tail)) { ... }                        // scans the whole O(n) tail
  return 0
}}
// lib/re.mjs:91-93 — every char of "mailto:" (incl. ':','-',';') is in this class:
re.src_email_name = '[\\-;:&=\\+\\$,\\.a-zA-Z0-9_][\\-;:&=\\+\\$,\\"\\.a-zA-Z0-9_]*'

The while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) { …testSchemaAt… } scan loop calls the validator at each mailto: hit; src_email_name greedily consumes the whole tail (all chars are in its class) then fails for lack of @. http:/https: do NOT blow up — their validator requires the tail to start with //, failing in O(1) per hit.

Proof of Concept (confirmed, linkify-it 5.0.1, Node v24)

const LinkifyIt = require('linkify-it');
const lf = new LinkifyIt();
lf.match('mailto:'.repeat(48000));   // ~336 KB of "mailto:mailto:…" -> seconds of blocked event loop
input (same bytes) 56 KB 112 KB 224 KB 336 KB
mailto: contiguous 97 ms 357 ms 1438 ms 3272 ms
mailto: space-separated 2 ms 3 ms 5 ms 8 ms
http:// contiguous 12 ms 17 ms 33 ms 49 ms

×~4 per 2× input ⇒ O(n²); equal-byte controls stay flat ⇒ algorithmic, not a GC/allocation artifact. Real-world via markdown-it 14.x ({linkify:true}), md.render('mailto:'.repeat(n)): 219 KB ≈ ~5 s.

Impact

Reachable on arbitrary user text via the documented .test()/.match() API and through markdown-it's linkifier — comment systems, chat, forums, wikis, note apps that render user markdown with linkify enabled. A ~220 KB post hangs the event loop ~5 s; a few hundred KB → tens of seconds. Availability only.

Suggested remediation

Bound the email local-part per RFC 5321 (≤64) so per-hit work is O(1), and avoid the full-tail slice:

// lib/re.mjs — cap the greedy run:
re.src_email_name = '[\\-;:&=\\+\\$,\\.a-zA-Z0-9_][\\-;:&=\\+\\$,\\"\\.a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,63}'
// index.mjs — prefer a sticky regex anchored at `pos` over text.slice(pos).

Affected / disclosure

All versions through 5.0.1 (latest); same code on master. cve-mcp/OSV report no known vulnerability for linkify-it. Distinct from markdown-it's own *-run ReDoS (CVE-2026-2327, different package/path) and the recent markdown-it DoS. Reported privately; happy to test a patch against the PoC.

EPSS Score: 0.00346 (0.269)

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

ADVISORY - github

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity


GitHub

CREATED

UPDATED

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

3.9

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)

CVSS SCORE

7.5high
PackageTypeOS NameOS VersionAffected RangesFix Versions
linkify-itnpm--<=5.0.15.0.2

CVSS:3 Severity and metrics

The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

There is no loss of confidentiality.

There is no loss of trust or accuracy within the impacted component.

There is a total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.