CVE-2026-73089

Vulnerability Details

File: index.js Location: cache (browserslist()'s result cache, line ~402) and parseCache (parseQueries()'s AST cache)

Root Cause

var cache = {}
var parseCache = {}

function browserslist(queries, opts) {
  ...
  var cacheKey = JSON.stringify([queries, context])
  if (cache[cacheKey]) return cache[cacheKey]
  ...
  if (!env.env.BROWSERSLIST_DISABLE_CACHE) { cache[cacheKey] = result }
  return result
}

function parseQueries(queries) {
  var cacheKey = JSON.stringify(queries)
  if (cacheKey in parseCache) return parseCache[cacheKey]
  var result = parseWithoutCache(QUERIES, queries)
  if (!env.env.BROWSERSLIST_DISABLE_CACHE) { parseCache[cacheKey] = result }
  ...
}

Every distinct (queries, context) pair is cached forever — no size cap, TTL, or eviction. browserslist.clearCaches() never resets either object (it only resets node.js's own filesystem caches); the only opt-out is the BROWSERSLIST_DISABLE_CACHE env var, controlled by the calling application, not an attacker.

Some short, valid queries amplify this badly. The since <year>-<month>-<day> query type (/^since (\d+)-(\d+)-(\d+)$/i) accepts any digit combination — Date.UTC() normalizes rather than rejects out-of-range values — giving an effectively unbounded space of ~17-byte distinct cache keys, each of which resolves to (and caches) a result close to the full ~8.5 KB browser list for any sufficiently old year.

Measured Impact

20,000 distinct since <year>-<month>-<day> queries (~330 KB total input, --expose-gc before/after measurement to rule out uncollected garbage) retained over 50 MB of heap permanently — roughly 150x amplification, growing linearly with no cap observed up to 40,000 queries (52.3 MB).

Attack Scenario

Any long-running process (server, daemon, warm CI worker) that calls browserslist() with a query value that varies across requests/items and is influenced, even partially, by external input accumulates one cache entry per distinct value ever seen. An attacker who can influence that value across many requests (this is a volumetric attack, unlike the single-request DoS findings from this same research pass) sends a stream of cheap, distinct queries (e.g. since 1900-01-01, since 1900-01-02, ...) until the process runs out of memory and crashes.

Recommended Fix (implemented and verified)

Replace both plain-object caches with Maps bounded to a fixed maximum entry count, evicting the oldest entry once the cap is reached (Map preserves insertion order, so .keys().next().value is always oldest):

var CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES = 500

function boundedCacheSet(map, key, value) {
  if (map.size >= CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES) {
    map.delete(map.keys().next().value)
  }
  map.set(key, value)
}

var cache = new Map()
var parseCache = new Map()

(read sites changed to .has()/.get(), write sites to boundedCacheSet())

Verification:

• NODE_ENV=test npx uvu test .test.js → 301/301 pass unmodified (test/cache.test.js exercises clearCaches()/BROWSERSLIST_DISABLE_CACHE against node.js's separate filesystem caches, unaffected here); confirmed a repeated identical call still returns the cached reference.
• Re-ran the memory PoC post-fix: heap stayed flat at ~4.9 MB after 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, and 40,000 distinct since-date queries (was 10.5 → 16.5 → 28.4 → 52.3 MB pre-fix).

Impact

• Who is affected: Long-running processes calling browserslist() with query values that vary across requests/items and are influenced by external input.
• What an attacker achieves: DoS via eventual out-of-memory crash, given sustained traffic over time (not a single small payload).
• Conditions required: No authentication; requires volume rather than a single request, hence Medium rather than High severity.

Verification Environment

browserslist @ HEAD (== v4.28.6, current latest stable release) under local Node.js v20.19.5, run with --expose-gc for accurate heap measurement.

Note

Found during a broader review of this codebase in the same research pass that produced GHSA-rrmg-cfrq-23vv (parse.js algorithmic complexity), GHSA-g6p8-hj8g-x889 (baseline regexp ReDoS), GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g (normalizeStats crash/prototype write), and GHSA-h633-868p-5rfw (SCOPED_CONFIG__PATTERN ReDoS) — all single-request DoS vectors. This one is different in character (volumetric, not single-request) and is reported separately/scored lower accordingly.