GHSA-72gr-qfp7-vwhw
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
The serveStatic utility in h3 applies a redundant decodeURI() call to the request pathname after H3Event has already performed percent-decoding with %25 preservation. This double decoding converts %252e%252e into %2e%2e, which bypasses resolveDotSegments() (since it checks for literal . characters, not percent-encoded equivalents). When the resulting asset ID is resolved by URL-based backends (CDN, S3, object storage), %2e%2e is interpreted as .. per the URL Standard, enabling path traversal to read arbitrary files from the backend.
Details
The vulnerability is a conflict between two decoding stages:
Stage 1 — H3Event constructor (src/event.ts:65-69):
if (url.pathname.includes("%")) {
url.pathname = decodeURI(
url.pathname.includes("%25") ? url.pathname.replace(/%25/g, "%2525") : url.pathname,
);
}
This correctly preserves %25 sequences by escaping them before decoding. A request for /%252e%252e/etc/passwd produces event.url.pathname = /%2e%2e/etc/passwd — the %25 was preserved so %252e became %2e (not .).
Stage 2 — serveStatic (src/utils/static.ts:86-88):
const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
);
This applies a second decodeURI(), which decodes %2e → ., producing /../../../etc/passwd. However, the decoding happens inside the resolveDotSegments() call argument — decodeURI runs first, then resolveDotSegments processes the result.
Wait — re-examining the flow more carefully:
- Input pathname after event.ts:
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd decodeURI()in static.ts converts%2e→., producing:/../../../etc/passwdresolveDotSegments("/../../../etc/passwd")does resolve..segments, clamping to/etc/passwd
The actual bypass is subtler. decodeURI() does not decode %2e — it only decodes characters that encodeURI would encode. Since . is never encoded by encodeURI, %2e is not decoded by decodeURI(). So the chain is:
- Request:
/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd - After event.ts decode:
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd decodeURI()in static.ts:/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd(unchanged —decodeURIdoesn't decode%2e)resolveDotSegments()fast-returns at line 56 because%2econtains no literal.character:if (!path.includes(".")) { return path; }- Asset ID
/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwdis passed togetMeta()andgetContents()callbacks - URL-based backends resolve
%2e%2eas..per RFC 3986 / URL Standard
The root cause is resolveDotSegments() only checks for literal . characters and does not account for percent-encoded dot sequences (%2e). The decodeURI() in static.ts is redundant (event.ts already decodes) but is not the direct cause — the real gap is that %2e%2e survives as a traversal payload through both decoding stages and resolveDotSegments.
PoC
1. Create a minimal h3 server with a URL-based static backend:
// server.mjs
import { H3, serveStatic } from "h3";
import { serve } from "srvx";
const app = new H3();
app.get("/**", (event) => {
return serveStatic(event, {
getMeta(id) {
console.log("[getMeta] asset ID:", id);
// Simulate URL-based backend (CDN/S3)
const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
console.log("[getMeta] resolved URL:", url.href);
return { type: "text/plain" };
},
getContents(id) {
console.log("[getContents] asset ID:", id);
const url = new URL(id, "https://cdn.example.com/static/");
console.log("[getContents] resolved URL:", url.href);
return `Fetched from: ${url.href}`;
},
});
});
serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port: 3000 });
2. Send the double-encoded traversal request:
curl -v 'http://localhost:3000/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd'
3. Observe server logs:
[getMeta] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getMeta] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd
[getContents] asset ID: /%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd
[getContents] resolved URL: https://cdn.example.com/etc/passwd
The %2e%2e sequences in the asset ID are resolved as .. by the URL constructor, causing the backend URL to traverse from /static/ to /etc/passwd.
Impact
- Arbitrary file read from backend storage: An unauthenticated attacker can read files outside the intended static asset directory on any URL-based backend (CDN origins, S3 buckets, object storage, reverse-proxied file servers).
- Sensitive data exposure: Depending on the backend, this could expose configuration files, credentials, source code, or other tenants' data in shared storage.
- Affected deployments: Applications using
serveStaticwith callbacks that resolve asset IDs via URL construction (new URL(id, baseUrl)or equivalent). This is a common pattern for CDN proxying and cloud object storage backends. Filesystem-based backends usingpath.join()are not affected since%2e%2eis not resolved as a traversal sequence by filesystem APIs.
Recommended Fix
The resolveDotSegments() function must account for percent-encoded dot sequences. Additionally, the redundant decodeURI() in serveStatic should be removed since H3Event already handles decoding.
Fix 1 — Remove redundant decodeURI in src/utils/static.ts:86-88:
const originalId = resolveDotSegments(
- decodeURI(withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname))),
+ withLeadingSlash(withoutTrailingSlash(event.url.pathname)),
);
Fix 2 — Harden resolveDotSegments in src/utils/internal/path.ts:55-73 to handle percent-encoded dots:
export function resolveDotSegments(path: string): string {
- if (!path.includes(".")) {
+ if (!path.includes(".") && !path.toLowerCase().includes("%2e")) {
return path;
}
// Normalize backslashes to forward slashes to prevent traversal via `\`
- const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/").split("/");
+ const segments = path.replaceAll("\\", "/")
+ .replaceAll(/%2e/gi, ".")
+ .split("/");
const resolved: string[] = [];
Both fixes should be applied. Fix 1 removes the unnecessary double-decode. Fix 2 provides defense-in-depth by ensuring resolveDotSegments cannot be bypassed with percent-encoded dots regardless of the caller.
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
GitHub
2.2
CVSS SCORE
5.9medium| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| h3 | npm | - | - | <=1.15.8 | 1.15.9 |
CVSS:3 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control, requiring investing a measurable amount of effort in research, preparation, or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack.
The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
There is no loss of trust or accuracy within the impacted component.
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.