GHSA-f4gw-2p7v-4548
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
Axios versions containing lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js do not treat 0.0.0.0 as a local address when evaluating NO_PROXY rules. In Node.js applications that use HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY together with NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 or similar, a request to http://0.0.0.0:<port>/ can be routed through the configured proxy instead of bypassing it.
The issue is exploitable when an attacker can influence the axios request URL or a followed redirect target, and when the proxy can reach or relay 0.0.0.0 to local services. This is a Node.js runtime proxy-routing issue, not a browser, install-time, or development-tooling issue.
Impact
Applications are affected when all of the following are true:
- The application runs axios in Node.js with the HTTP adapter.
- The process uses environment proxy variables such as
HTTP_PROXYorHTTPS_PROXY. - The process uses
NO_PROXYentries such aslocalhost,127.0.0.1, or::1to keep local traffic out of the proxy path. - Attacker-controlled input can influence the request URL or redirect target.
- The configured proxy does not reject
0.0.0.0and can reach the local destination.
For plain HTTP targets, the proxy can receive the full request URL, headers, and body, and may be able to observe the local service response. HTTPS targets are less exposed because axios uses CONNECT tunneling in current versions.
Affected Functionality
Affected functionality is limited to environment-derived proxy selection in the Node HTTP adapter:
lib/adapters/http.jscallsgetProxyForUrl(location)and thenshouldBypassProxy(location)before applying the proxy.lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.jsnormalizes and comparesNO_PROXYentries.- Explicit caller-provided
config.proxyremains trusted caller configuration. - Browser, React Native, XHR, and fetch adapter behavior are not affected.
Technical Details
lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js defines local loopback equivalence through isLoopback(). The current implementation recognizes localhost, IPv4 127.0.0.0/8, IPv6 ::1, and IPv4-mapped loopback forms, but it does not include 0.0.0.0.
At lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js:176, axios treats two hosts as matching when both are considered loopback:
return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));
Because isLoopback('0.0.0.0') returns false, NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 does not match http://0.0.0.0:<port>/. lib/adapters/http.js:185-193 then applies the environment proxy.
Proof of Concept of Attack
import http from 'http';
import axios from './index.js';
const listen = (handler, host = '127.0.0.1') =>
new Promise((resolve) => {
const server = http.createServer(handler);
server.listen(0, host, () => resolve(server));
});
const close = (server) => new Promise((resolve) => server.close(resolve));
const origin = await listen((req, res) => res.end('origin'), '0.0.0.0');
let proxyRequests = 0;
const proxy = await listen((req, res) => {
proxyRequests += 1;
res.end('proxied');
});
process.env.http_proxy = `http://127.0.0.1:${proxy.address().port}`;
process.env.HTTP_PROXY = process.env.http_proxy;
process.env.no_proxy = 'localhost,127.0.0.1,::1';
process.env.NO_PROXY = process.env.no_proxy;
try {
const direct = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${origin.address().port}/`);
const zero = await axios.get(`http://0.0.0.0:${origin.address().port}/`);
console.log({ direct: direct.data, zero: zero.data, proxyRequests });
} finally {
await close(origin);
await close(proxy);
}
Expected safe behavior: both 127.0.0.1 and 0.0.0.0 bypass the proxy when the NO_PROXY policy is intended to cover local destinations.
Observed behavior: 127.0.0.1 bypasses the proxy, while 0.0.0.0 is sent through the proxy.
Workarounds
- Add
0.0.0.0explicitly toNO_PROXYwhere local addresses must bypass proxies. - Reject or normalize
0.0.0.0in application URL validation before calling axios. - Set
proxy: falseon axios requests that must never use environment proxies. - Configure the proxy itself to reject
0.0.0.0, loopback, link-local, and internal address ranges.
Summary
axios versions 1.15.0–1.16.1 contain an incomplete loopback-address check in lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js. The isLoopback() function correctly identifies 127.0.0.0/8 and ::1 as loopback addresses but does not recognise 0.0.0.0 — the IPv4 unspecified address, which routes to the local machine on Linux and macOS.
An attacker who controls a URL passed to axios can use http://0.0.0.0/<path> to bypass proxy-based SSRF filtering that the application relies upon.
Details
Affected versions
>= 1.15.0, <= 1.16.1
The vulnerability was introduced in v1.15.0 when the shouldBypassProxy helper was added as a security improvement (PR #10661).
Root cause
File: lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js
// Line 1 — static allowlist (incomplete)
const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']); // ← 0.0.0.0 missing
const isIPv4Loopback = (host) => {
const parts = host.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
if (parts[0] !== '127') return false; // ← 0.0.0.0: parts[0] = '0' → false
return parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255);
};
const isLoopback = (host) => {
if (!host) return false;
if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true; // ← '0.0.0.0' not in set
if (isIPv4Loopback(host)) return true; // ← returns false for 0.0.0.0
return isIPv6Loopback(host);
};
isLoopback('0.0.0.0') returns false.
Node's WHATWG URL parser does not normalise 0.0.0.0 to 127.0.0.1. Other bypass forms are safe: new URL('http://0177.0.0.1/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (octal), new URL('http://2130706433/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (decimal), new URL('http://0x7f000001/').hostname → '127.0.0.1' (hex). Only 0.0.0.0 escapes normalisation.
### PoC
'use strict';
// Verbatim copy of relevant logic from axios v1.16.1 shouldBypassProxy.js
const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']);
const isIPv4Loopback = (host) => {
const parts = host.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 4) return false;
if (parts[0] !== '127') return false;
return parts.every((p) => /^\d+$/.test(p) && Number(p) >= 0 && Number(p) <= 255);
};
const isLoopback = (host) => {
if (!host) return false;
if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true;
return isIPv4Loopback(host);
};
// 1. Show URL parser does NOT normalise 0.0.0.0
console.log(new URL('http://0.0.0.0/').hostname); // → '0.0.0.0' ← NOT normalised
console.log(new URL('http://0177.0.0.1/').hostname); // → '127.0.0.1' ← normalised (safe)
console.log(new URL('http://2130706433/').hostname); // → '127.0.0.1' ← normalised (safe)
// 2. Show isLoopback fails for 0.0.0.0
console.log(isLoopback('0.0.0.0')); // → false ← BUG: should be true
console.log(isLoopback('127.0.0.1')); // → true ← correct
Verified output on Node.js v22 / axios v1.16.1:
0.0.0.0 ← NOT normalised by URL parser
127.0.0.1 ← octal normalised correctly
127.0.0.1 ← decimal normalised correctly
false ← 0.0.0.0 not detected as loopback ⚠
true ← 127.0.0.1 correctly detected
### Impact
Applications that:
Accept user-supplied URLs and pass them to axios
Use a proxy with NO_PROXY=localhost (or similar) for SSRF filtering
…can be bypassed by supplying http://0.0.0.0/<path>. Axios routes the request through the proxy (shouldBypassProxy returns false). If the proxy itself does not filter 0.0.0.0, the connection reaches the local machine — exposing internal services such as cloud IMDS endpoints, internal admin panels, or microservice APIs.
Fix
Minimal (one line):
- const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost']);
+ const LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES = new Set(['localhost', '0.0.0.0']);
Comprehensive:
const isIPv4Unspecified = (host) => host === '0.0.0.0';
const isLoopback = (host) => {
if (!host) return false;
if (LOOPBACK_HOSTNAMES.has(host)) return true;
if (isIPv4Loopback(host)) return true;
if (isIPv4Unspecified(host)) return true; // add this line
return isIPv6Loopback(host);
};
</details>
GitHub
CVSS SCORE
6.9medium| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| axios | npm | - | - | >=1.15.0,<1.18.0 | 1.18.0 |
| axios | npm | - | - | >=0.31.0,<0.33.0 | 0.33.0 |
CVSS:4 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: A race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability. The successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker. The attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful. Network injection. The attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker).
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges.
There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the Vulnerable System.
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the Subsequent System being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
There is no impact to availability within the Vulnerable System.
There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.