GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout
with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with --pathspec-file-nul
makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec
error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the
entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.
This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create()
with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and
cleared.
Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment
"--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found":
| Call site | git command | that advisory's assessment |
|---|---|---|
IndexFile.remove() |
rm |
--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
IndexFile.move() |
mv |
same |
HEAD.reset() |
reset |
same |
HEAD.checkout() |
checkout |
same |
That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with
--pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first
line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag
of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the
whole file one pathspec.
Root cause
git/index/base.py:991-1043:
def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
...
removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines() # line 1043
git/refs/head.py:237-268:
def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
...
self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs) # line 268
Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.
Proof of concept
from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError
repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)
try:
repo.index.remove([], **kw) # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
print(e.stderr) # <- entire file contents
Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:
[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3
The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.
Scope correction to the table above
Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:
| Call site | disclosed? |
|---|---|
IndexFile.remove() → git rm |
yes, full file |
Head.checkout() → git checkout |
yes, full file |
HEAD.reset() → git reset |
no - git reset does not error on unmatched pathspecs |
IndexFile.move() → git mv |
no |
The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.
GitHub
CVSS SCORE
6.5medium| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| gitpython | pypi | - | - | <=3.1.57 | 3.1.58 |
CVSS:3 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.
An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.
There is no loss of trust or accuracy within the impacted component.
There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.