GHSA-pmv8-rq9r-6j72
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
Axios versions starting with 0.28.0 contain uncontrolled recursion in formDataToJSON, which is exposed as axios.formToJSON() and used internally when axios serialises FormData with Content-Type: application/json.
If an application passes attacker-controlled FormData field names to this functionality, a field name with thousands of nested bracket segments can exhaust the JavaScript call stack and cause denial of service for that request or, in applications without appropriate error handling, process termination.
Impact
Applications are affected only when untrusted users can control FormData key names that are converted through axios.
Affected paths include direct use of axios.formToJSON() on untrusted FormData and axios requests in which attacker-controlled FormData is sent with Content-Type: application/json.
The observed failure is RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded. In local testing, this error is catchable, so process-wide crash depends on the consuming application's error handling and runtime behaviour.
Affected Functionality
Affected functionality:
axios.formToJSON(formData)- Named ESM export
formToJSON - Default
transformRequestbehaviour forFormDatawhenContent-Typecontainsapplication/json
Unaffected functionality:
- Normal multipart
FormDatasubmission without JSON serialisation toFormData, which already enforces amaxDepthguard- Axios versions
<=0.27.2, whereformDataToJSONwas not present
Technical Details
The vulnerable code is in lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js.
parsePropPath() splits a field name such as a[x][x][x] into path segments. buildPath() then recursively processes one segment per call without enforcing a maximum depth:
const result = buildPath(path, value, target[name], index);
A key with thousands of bracket-delimited segments causes thousands of recursive calls and can exceed the JavaScript engine's call stack limit.
Relevant source locations:
lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.jscontains the unbounded recursivebuildPath().lib/axios.jsexposes the helper asaxios.formToJSON.index.jsexposesformToJSONas a named export.index.d.tsandindex.d.ctsdeclare the public API.lib/defaults/index.jscallsformDataToJSON(data)when JSON-serializingFormData.
The inverse helper, toFormData, already enforces maxDepth and throws AxiosError with ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED, but formDataToJSON does not have an equivalent guard.
Proof of Concept of Attack
import axios from 'axios';
const fd = new FormData();
fd.append('a' + '[x]'.repeat(15000), 'value');
try {
axios.formToJSON(fd);
console.log('not vulnerable');
} catch (e) {
console.log(`${e.constructor.name}: ${e.message}`);
}
Expected result on affected versions:
RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
The same condition can be reached via an axios request transformation when attacker-controlled FormData is sent with Content-Type: application/json.
Workarounds
Applications can reject or normalise untrusted form field names before calling axios.formToJSON().
Applications can avoid sending untrusted FormData through axios as JSON unless JSON conversion is required.
Applications should catch errors around formToJSON() or axios requests that transform untrusted FormData.
Summary
An uncontrolled recursion vulnerability in formDataToJSON allows any user who controls FormData input to crash a Node.js process with a single request. The function recurses once per bracket-delimited segment in a FormData key name with no depth limit, so a key like a[x][x][x]... with 15,000+ segments exhausts the call stack. This is a denial-of-service that kills the process via an unrecoverable RangeError. The inverse function toFormData already enforces a maxDepth limit (default 100) for exactly this reason — formDataToJSON lacks the equivalent guard.
Details
Vulnerable function: buildPath in lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js, lines 50–82.
buildPath(path, value, target, index) is called recursively — once per segment in the parsed property path — with no depth check:
// lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js, lines 50–82
function buildPath(path, value, target, index) {
let name = path[index++]; // advance one level
if (name === '__proto__') return true;
// ...
if (!isLast) {
// ...
const result = buildPath(path, value, target[name], index); // recurse — NO depth guard
// ...
}
}
The key is first split into segments by parsePropPath (line 17), which extracts every [segment] via regex. A key with 15,000 bracket pairs produces a 15,001-element array, causing 15,001 recursive calls — well beyond the V8 default stack limit (~10,000–15,000 frames).
formDataToJSON is a public API consumed two ways:
Directly by consumers — exported as
axios.formToJSON()(lib/axios.js:80), with TypeScript declarations in bothindex.d.ts:699andindex.d.cts:708, and documented in the API reference in four languages (docs/pages/advanced/api-reference.md).Internally by
transformRequest— called atlib/defaults/index.js:56when the request body isFormDataandContent-Typecontainsapplication/json:return hasJSONContentType ? JSON.stringify(formDataToJSON(data)) : data;
Contrast with toFormData: The inverse function (lib/helpers/toFormData.js:118) enforces maxDepth (default 100) and throws AxiosError with code ERR_FORM_DATA_DEPTH_EXCEEDED when exceeded. formDataToJSON has no equivalent protection.
PoC
Requires only Node.js and an unmodified axios v1.x install:
import formDataToJSON from 'axios/lib/helpers/formDataToJSON.js';
// Build a FormData with a single key containing 15,000 nested bracket segments
const fd = new FormData();
const key = "a" + "[x]".repeat(15000);
fd.append(key, "value");
try {
formDataToJSON(fd);
console.log("Not vulnerable");
} catch (e) {
console.log(e.constructor.name + ": " + e.message);
// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
}
Verified output on Node.js 22.22.3 against axios v1.16.1 (current v1.x HEAD):
RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded
The process crashes. In a server context (e.g., Express middleware calling axios.formToJSON() on an uploaded form), a single crafted request terminates the process.
Impact
Denial of Service (process crash). Any unauthenticated user who can submit FormData to a Node.js application that passes it through axios.formToJSON() — or that sends it as a JSON-serialized FormData body via axios — can crash the server process with a single request. The RangeError from stack exhaustion is unrecoverable in many contexts (it cannot be reliably caught when the stack is already full). No authentication or special privileges are required; the attacker only needs to control a FormData key name.
GitHub
CVSS SCORE
6.3medium| Package | Type | OS Name | OS Version | Affected Ranges | Fix Versions |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| axios | npm | - | - | >=1.0.0,<1.18.0 | 1.18.0 |
| axios | npm | - | - | >=0.28.0,<0.33.0 | 0.33.0 |
CVSS:4 Severity and metrics
The CVSS metrics represent different qualitative aspects of a vulnerability that impact the overall score, as defined by the CVSS Specification.
The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone). One example of an Adjacent attack would be an ARP (IPv4) or neighbor discovery (IPv6) flood leading to a denial of service on the local LAN segment (e.g., CVE-2013-6014).
Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success when attacking the vulnerable component.
The successful attack depends on the presence of specific deployment and execution conditions of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These include: A race condition must be won to successfully exploit the vulnerability. The successfulness of the attack is conditioned on execution conditions that are not under full control of the attacker. The attack may need to be launched multiple times against a single target before being successful. Network injection. The attacker must inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim (e.g. vulnerabilities requiring an on-path attacker).
The attacker is unauthenticated prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files of the vulnerable system to carry out an attack.
The vulnerable system can be exploited without interaction from any human user, other than the attacker. Examples include: a remote attacker is able to send packets to a target system a locally authenticated attacker executes code to elevate privileges.
There is no loss of confidentiality within the Vulnerable System.
There is no loss of confidentiality within the Subsequent System or all confidentiality impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
There is no loss of integrity within the Vulnerable System.
There is no loss of integrity within the Subsequent System or all integrity impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.
Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the Vulnerable System are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the Vulnerable System.
There is no impact to availability within the Subsequent System or all availability impact is constrained to the Vulnerable System.