CVE-2026-39883
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
The fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin ioreg command to use an absolute path but left the BSD kenv command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.
Root Cause
sdk/resource/host_id.go line 42:
if result, err := r.execCommand("kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {
Compare with the fixed Darwin path at line 58:
result, err := r.execCommand("/usr/sbin/ioreg", "-rd1", "-c", "IOPlatformExpertDevice")
The execCommand helper at sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go uses exec.Command(name, arg...) which searches $PATH when the command name contains no path separator.
Affected platforms (per build tag in host_id_bsd.go:4): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.
The kenv path is reached when /etc/hostid does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.
Attack
- Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk - Attacker places a malicious
kenvbinary earlier in$PATH - Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup
hostIDReaderBSD.read()callsexec.Command("kenv", ...)which resolves to the malicious binary- Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application
Same attack vector and impact as CVE-2026-24051.
Suggested Fix
Use the absolute path:
if result, err := r.execCommand("/bin/kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {
On FreeBSD, kenv is located at /bin/kenv.
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Untrusted Search Path
GitHub
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