CVE-2026-44005

Summary

vm2's bridge exposes mutable proxies for real host-realm intrinsic prototypes and then forwards sandbox writes into the underlying host objects with otherReflectSet() and otherReflectDefineProperty(), which lets attacker-controlled JavaScript running in a default VM or inherited NodeVM mutate shared host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, and Function.prototype from inside the sandbox.

Details

BaseHandler.apply() unwraps sandbox-controlled receivers and arguments with otherFromThis() / otherFromThisArguments() and then directly invokes the real host function with ret = otherReflectApply(object, context, args), so any default-exposed host function that can surface a prototype getter becomes a prototype-walking primitive (lib/bridge.js:665-676). BaseHandler.get() special-cases proto and returns the host-side descriptor or proxy target prototype, which is enough for the attacker to reuse the host lookupGetter('proto') accessor repeatedly until the walk lands on host Object.prototype, Array.prototype, or Function.prototype (lib/bridge.js:590-616). Once the attacker has a proxy to a host intrinsic prototype, BaseHandler.set() performs value = otherFromThis(value); return otherReflectSet(object, key, value) === true;, which writes attacker-controlled data directly into the shared host object instead of keeping the mutation sandbox-local; BaseHandler.defineProperty() repeats the same design at otherReflectDefineProperty(object, prop, otherDesc) for descriptor-based writes (lib/bridge.js:641-649, lib/bridge.js:753-774). Existing validation does not stop the attack because the constructor filter only blocks one dangerous-property access pattern, setPrototypeOf() only blocks prototype replacement rather than ordinary property assignment, and containsDangerousConstructor() only protects one later re-unwrapping path instead of the initial host-prototype write sink (lib/bridge.js:494-530, lib/bridge.js:595-610, lib/bridge.js:660-662).

PoC

Run the following code snippet and observe that the value of vm2EscapeMarker is polluted:

const { VM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM();
vm.run(`
  const g = ({}).__lookupGetter__;
  const a = Buffer.apply;
  const p = a.apply(g, [Buffer, ['__proto__']]);
  const hostObjectProto = p.call(p.call(p.call(p.call(Buffer.of()))));
  hostObjectProto.vm2EscapeMarker = 'polluted-object-prototype';
`);
console.log({}.vm2EscapeMarker)

Impact

Sandbox escape and prototype pollution.