CVE-2026-54512

jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV.

If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization.

An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list.

This is the same vulnerability class responsible for the historical sequence of jackson-databind deserialization CVEs; here it manifests as a validator bypass rather than a missing deny-list entry.

Impact

• Bypass of the PTV allow-list, including the recommended BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator configured with name-prefix allow rules.
• Arbitrary class instantiation of any type assignable to the container's element/parameter position, with attacker-controlled property values (setter/field injection).
• Potential unauthenticated remote code execution when a class with exploitable side effects (JNDI lookup, JDBC/connection-pool gadgets,TemplatesImpl-style loaders, etc.) is present on the classpath.

Applications that accept untrusted JSON and rely on a configured PTV — the documented, security-conscious configuration — are affected.

Proof of Concept

Configuration restricting polymorphic deserialization to a single safe container:

BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
        .allowIfSubType("java.util.ArrayList")
        .build();

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
        .polymorphicTypeValidator(ptv)
        .build();

Malicious payload (Wrapper.value is Object with @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.CLASS, include = As.WRAPPER_ARRAY)):

{"value":["java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.EvilGadget>",[{"cmd":"calc.exe"}]]}

On vulnerable versions, com.evil.EvilGadget is instantiated and its cmd property is set, despite only java.util.ArrayList being allow-listed. On 2.18.8 / 2.21.4 / 3.1.4 the deserialization throws InvalidTypeIdException before instantiation.

Variant payloads (all bypass an ArrayList/HashMap allow-list):

Type ID	Smuggled type position
java.util.ArrayList<Evil>	list element
java.util.HashMap<Evil,String>	map key
java.util.HashMap<String,Evil>	map value
java.util.ArrayList<java.util.ArrayList<Evil>>	nested element
java.util.ArrayList<Evil[]>	array element

---

Patches

Fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4 and 3.1.4 via the changes for FasterXML/jackson-databind#5988, commit 434d6c511. The fix adds recursive validation of each non-trivial type parameter (and array element types appearing as parameters) through the full PTV chain, with documented exemptions for Object (wildcard resolution) and Enum types.

PolymorphicTypeValidator was added in 2.10.0 so vulnerability N/A for versions prior to that.