CVE-2026-6790
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
Jetty currently accepts HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 requests where the regular Host header and the pseudo-header :authority do not match. As a result, the same request can carry two different host identities through Jetty:
- logic based on
HttpURI/Request.getServerName(request)uses:authority - logic based on raw request headers continues to use
Host
This creates a host/authority confusion condition that can break security assumptions in higher layers.
Jetty already performs an explicit authority/Host consistency check on the HTTP/1.1 path, but equivalent validation is missing on the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 paths.
Security Impact
This issue is not inherently remote code execution, but it can become security-relevant in deployments that rely on the request host for security-sensitive decisions, including:
- host-based access control
- virtual host isolation
- multi-tenant routing by hostname
- login/logout/callback URL construction
- reverse proxy and forwarded-header trust chains
- auditing, cache keys, and absolute URL generation
Potential consequences include:
- bypass of host-based ACLs
- virtual host or tenant isolation failures
- incorrect or attacker-influenced redirect/callback targets
- inconsistent proxy/downstream interpretation of the original target host
- misleading logs and audit records
Technical Root Cause
- On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 metadata builder paths:
:authorityis parsed separately into authority/URI stateHostis preserved as a normal request header- the two values are not compared for consistency
- On the HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 server entry paths:
- Jetty calls
ComplianceUtils.verify(httpCompliance, requestMetaData, listener) - this verification does not enforce
MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
- On the HTTP/1.1 path:
- Jetty explicitly checks whether authority and
Hostmatch - mismatches are rejected by default
Relevant Code Locations
HTTP/2 metadata builder:
jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-hpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/hpack/internal/MetaDataBuilder.java
HTTP/3 metadata builder:
jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-qpack/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/qpack/internal/metadata/MetaDataBuilder.java
HTTP/2 server entry:
jetty-core/jetty-http2/jetty-http2-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http2/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP2.java
HTTP/3 server entry:
jetty-core/jetty-http3/jetty-http3-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http3/server/internal/HttpStreamOverHTTP3.java
Shared HTTP compliance verification:
jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/ComplianceUtils.java
HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:
jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/HttpConnection.java
Defined but not enforced on H2/H3:
jetty-core/jetty-http/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/http/HttpCompliance.java- violation: MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY
Reproduction
I reproduced this on local Jetty 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT source.
Minimal reproduction steps:
- Start a Jetty HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 test server.
- Send a request with:
- :authority = localhost:
- Host = evil.example:
- In the request handler, inspect both:
- Request.getServerName(request)
- request.getHeaders().get(HttpHeader.HOST)
- Observe whether Jetty rejects the request or allows both values to remain visible.
Observed result:
- HTTP/2: request is accepted and returns 200
- HTTP/3: request is accepted and returns 200
- the server can observe both:
- serverName=localhost
- hostHeader=evil.example:
This shows that a single attacker-controlled request can preserve two conflicting host interpretations inside Jetty.
Tests Used
HTTP/2 rejection test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority
HTTP/2 exploitability test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http2.tests.HTTP2Test#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader
HTTP/3 rejection test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testRejectMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthority
HTTP/3 exploitability test:
org.eclipse.jetty.http3.tests.HandlerClientServerTest#testMismatchedHostHeaderAndAuthoritySplitsAuthorityFromHostHeader
Observed behavior:
- both rejection tests fail because Jetty returns 200 instead of 400
- both exploitability tests pass, confirming that Jetty exposes different host values to different layers
Project-Internal Evidence of Real Impact
Examples:
jetty-openidusesRequest.getServerName(request)to construct redirect URLsjetty-ee11-proxyuses the rawHostheader when buildingForwarded
This indicates that the issue is not merely theoretical: Jetty’s own ecosystem already contains code paths where different host sources are used for different purposes.
Affected Version
Confirmed affected version:
- 12.1.9-SNAPSHOT
Other versions may also be affected if they share the same HTTP/2 / HTTP/3 request construction and compliance-validation logic. I have not yet completed a historical version matrix and would recommend confirming exact affected ranges from Jetty’s branch history.
Suggested Fix
Recommend adding HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 validation equivalent to the existing HTTP/1.1 authority/Host consistency check:
- if both :authority and regular Host are present
- normalize and compare them
- if they do not match, reject the request with 400 Bad Request
- route the failure through the existing MISMATCHED_AUTHORITY compliance mechanism
Also adding explicit HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 regression coverage for this case.
Disclosure Status
- not publicly disclosed
- no public issue filed
- shared only privately with the Jetty security contacts
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Improper Input Validation
GitHub
3.9
CVSS SCORE
5.3mediumDebian
-
Ubuntu
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