CVE-2026-73229
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Summary
AdminRenderer may disclose data that would normally be protected by GET permissions when rendering a 400 Bad Request response for an invalid write request.
If a view allows POST (or another write method) but denies GET, an invalid request rendered through AdminRenderer can invoke the view's GET handler and include data from the GET representation in the generated HTML response.
This behavior appears to be specific to AdminRenderer and does not affect the normal JSON rendering path.
Details
While investigating the AdminRenderer rendering flow, I observed that invalid write requests are rendered by temporarily overriding the request method and invoking the view's GET handler:
with override_method(view, request, "GET") as request:
response = view.get(request, *view.args, **view.kwargs)
data = response.data
This execution path differs from a normal GET request.
Under normal request processing, a GET request flows through:
APIView.dispatch()
└── APIView.initial()
└── APIView.check_permissions()
However, during AdminRenderer rendering, the renderer directly invokes:
view.get(...)
A view whose permission class explicitly allowed POST but denied GET still executed its GET handler while rendering an invalid POST request through AdminRenderer.
As a result, data intended to be available only through an authorized GET request was included in the generated HTML response.
Proof of Concept
Using a standard ListCreateAPIView.
Permission class:
class ProbePermission(BasePermission):
def has_permission(self, request, view):
return request.method == "POST"
View:
class View(ListCreateAPIView):
renderer_classes = (AdminRenderer, JSONRenderer)
permission_classes = (ProbePermission,)
serializer_class = ProbeSerializer
def get_queryset(self):
return [
{
"name": "visible",
"secret": "GET-ONLY-SECRET",
}
]
Expected Behaviour
GET request
→ 403 Forbidden
Invalid POST request
→ 400 Bad Request
→ Response should contain only validation errors.
→ GET-only data should not be rendered.
Observed Behaviour
GET request
→ 403 Forbidden
Invalid POST request rendered through AdminRenderer
→ 400 Bad Request
→ HTML response contains:
GET-ONLY-SECRET
Tthe same behavior is shown using a minimal APIView implementation.
Observed results:
minimal.post_400.handler_calls =
[
("post", "POST"),
("get", "GET")
]
minimal.post_400.contains_secret = True
Generic view reproduction:
generic.direct_get.status = 403
generic.direct_get.contains_secret = False
generic.post_400.status = 400
generic.post_400.contains_secret = True
generic.post_400.permission_calls =
[
("GenericAdminView", "POST"),
...
("GenericAdminView", "OPTIONS")
]
generic.post_400.queryset_calls =
[
("GenericAdminView", "GET"),
...
]
These observations indicate that direct GET requests are correctly denied, while the simulated GET used during AdminRenderer rendering can still retrieve the protected representation.
Impact
This issue may result in information disclosure when all of the following conditions are met:
AdminRenderer is enabled.
The client negotiates the HTML renderer (for example using Accept: text/html).
The application permits POST (or another write method).
GET requests are denied by the configured permission class.
The invalid write request returns 400 Bad Request.
The GET representation contains information that the requester would normally not be permitted to access.
This issue does not appear to affect:
JSON rendering
Standard API responses
Successful write requests
The behavior appears limited to the HTML rendering path used by AdminRenderer.
Suggested Fix
Possible approaches include:
Perform equivalent permission checks before executing the simulated GET request.
Avoid invoking view.get() when the corresponding GET request would not be permitted.
Fall back to rendering only serializer/form validation errors instead of retrieving the GET representation.
A regression test could create a permission class that allows POST while denying GET, then verify that an invalid POST rendered with AdminRenderer does not include data from the protected GET representation.
Environment
Repository:
encode/django-rest-framework
Branch tested:
security-audit-drf
Commit tested:
cf582fb58e9e5ffcc8ed78a2cb9aaa8f4865666a
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
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