CVE-2026-8384
ADVISORY - githubSummary
Description (as reported)
Summary
In Jetty 12.1.8, org.eclipse.jetty.util.URIUtil.canonicalPath() may leave dot-dot path segments unnormalized when a semicolon path parameter marker is followed by a slash and a dot segment.
A minimal example is:
/public;/../admin/secret
In my local reproduction, URIUtil.canonicalPath() returns:
/public/../admin/secret
instead of the expected normalized path:
/admin/secret
When Jetty's SecurityHandler.PathMapped is used to protect a path prefix such as /admin/*, the non-normalized canonical path may not match the protected prefix. As a result, an unauthenticated request may bypass the configured path-based security constraint.
Tested Version
Jetty: 12.1.8 JDK: 17.0.18 Maven: 3.9.14
Maven artifacts used:
org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-security:12.1.8 org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-session:12.1.8
Only confirmed Jetty 12.1.8 so far.
Minimal Reproduction
Starts a minimal Jetty server with the following security setup:
SecurityHandler.PathMapped security = new SecurityHandler.PathMapped();
security.put("/admin/*", Constraint.from("admin"));
security.put("/*", Constraint.ALLOWED);
security.setAuthenticator(new BasicAuthenticator());
The test then sends requests with no Authorization header.
Observed result:
GET /admin/secret -> 401
GET /public;x/../admin/secret -> 200
The handler receives paths such as:
/public/../admin/secret
This suggests that the /admin/* security constraint is bypassed because PathMapped matching is performed against the non-normalized canonical path.
Suspected Root Cause
The suspected root cause is in URIUtil.canonicalPath().
The relevant logic is approximately:
for (int i = 0; i < end; i++)
{
char c = encodedPath.charAt(i);
switch (c)
{
case ';':
if (builder == null)
{
builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
}
while (++i < end)
{
if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
{
builder.append('/');
break;
}
}
break;
case '.':
if (slash)
normal = false;
if (builder != null)
builder.append(c);
break;
}
slash = c == '/';
}
String canonical = (builder != null)
? (onBadUtf8 == null ? builder.toCompleteString() : builder.takeCompleteString(onBadUtf8))
: encodedPath;
return normal ? canonical : normalizePath(canonical);
For the input:
/public;/../admin/secret
when the outer loop reaches the semicolon:
i = 7
c = ';'
slash = false
normal = true
Inside case ';', the while (++i < end) loop advances i to the next character, which is already '/' for the empty path parameter form ";/".
The code then appends '/' to the canonical builder:
builder.append('/');
At this point, the canonical builder ends with '/':
/public/
However, the local variable c is still the old value ';', because c was read before entering the switch and is not updated when the inner loop advances i.
After leaving the switch, the loop updates the slash state using:
slash = c == '/';
Since c is still ';', slash becomes false.
On the next iteration, the scanner reaches '.', which is the first dot in the following "../" segment. Because slash is incorrectly false, this code does not run:
if (slash)
normal = false;
Therefore normal remains true, and canonicalPath() returns the canonical string directly instead of calling normalizePath(canonical).
The result is:
/public/../admin/secret
instead of:
/admin/secret
In short:
case ';' advances the scan position i and appends '/' to the canonical builder, but the loop tail still updates slash from the stale character c=';'. As a result, the following dot-dot segment is not detected as a path traversal segment.
More Precise Trigger Condition
The issue is not limited to a non-empty path parameter such as ";x".
The more precise trigger shape is:
;[^/]*/.
Examples:
/public;/../admin/secret
/public;x/../admin/secret
/public;anything/../admin/secret
/public;/./admin/secret
The minimal form is:
/public;/../admin/secret
because the semicolon is immediately followed by '/', so the inner while loop reaches '/' on its first increment.
Potential Minimal Fix Direction
A minimal fix would be to ensure that, when case ';' consumes input until '/' and appends '/' to the canonical builder, the slash state reflects the last effective character in the canonical path.
For example, conceptually:
case ';':
if (builder == null)
{
builder = new Utf8StringBuilder(encodedPath.length());
builder.append(encodedPath, 0, i);
}
while (++i < end)
{
if (encodedPath.charAt(i) == '/')
{
builder.append('/');
slash = true;
break;
}
}
continue;
The important part is to avoid the loop tail from overwriting slash using the stale c value:
slash = c == '/';
In other words, slash should represent the last effective character appended to the canonical builder, not the original input character read before case ';' advanced i.
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)
Use of Non-Canonical URL Paths for Authorization Decisions
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