RUSTSEC-2026-0122

ADVISORY - rustsec

Summary

InlineVec::clear() and SerVec::clear() in rkyv were not panic-safe. Both functions iterate over their elements and call drop_in_place on each, updating self.len only after the loop. If an element's Drop implementation panics during the loop, self.len is left at its original value.

A subsequent invocation of clear() on the same container then re-visits the already-freed elements:

  • InlineVec::clear() is called again from InlineVec's own Drop implementation when the value is later dropped.
  • SerVec::clear() is called again by SerVec::with_capacity() after the user closure returns.

Impact

  • CWE-415 (Double Free): heap corruption when the element type is one that owns memory, such as Box<T> or Vec<T>
  • CWE-416 (Use-After-Free): memory corruption when an element is accessed following a caught panic

Both types of undefined behavior can be invoked in safe Rust, but only if unwinding panics are enabled and std::panic::catch_unwind is used.

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)


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